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STARSHIPS AND ENTERPRISE: PRIVATE
SPACEFLIGHT COMPANIES’ PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND THE U.S. COMMERCIAL
SPACE LAUNCH COMPETITIVENESS ACT
STEPHEN DIMARIA†
INTRODUCTION
Although individual States and the international community
spent decades attempting to set up a legal regime in advance of
humanity’s return to outer space, technology is quickly beginning
to outpace law in a race out of the atmosphere. A recent NASAfunded study estimated that the United States, in partnership
with private industry, could return humans to the moon in as
little as five to seven years for about $10 billion.1 That same
study also contemplated the possibilities of an estimated $40
billion lunar base, which would dramatically cut costs in future
missions to Mars.2
Private space flight continues to flourish with companies like
Planetary Resources and Deep Space Industries beginning
programs and launching tests for prospecting lucrative resources
housed in asteroids.3 Further, a study published by The Keck
Institute for Space Studies estimated that finding a resource-rich
†
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University School of Law. I would like to thank my family for their innumerable
lessons and fervent support. I would also like to thank Assistant Dean Jeffrey
Walker for shaping this paper with our shared “a-ha moments,” and Professors
Christopher Borgen and Margaret McGuinness for their extremely valuable further
insight and teaching.
1
NASA-Funded
Study
Reduces
Cost
of
Human
Missions
to
Moon and Mars by Factor of Ten, NSS.ORG (July 20, 2015),
http://www.nss.org/news/releases/NSS_Release_20150720_LunarArchitecture.html.
2
Id. (explaining plans to harvest propellant from asteroids, store it in lunar
orbit, and use it to resupply spacecraft for further exploration).
3
James M. Smith, Space: The Orbital Industry, THEMARKETMOGUL.COM,
http://themarketmogul.com/space-orbital-industry (last visited Sept. 14, 2016).
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asteroid and bringing it into Earth’s orbit for mining would cost
only $2.6 billion.4 Compare these lowered costs to the potentially
enormous rewards in harvesting precious metals, helium-3, and
even water, and it becomes rather obvious why both
governmental and private entities are already on their way back
to the bounty of outer space.5
Although the technology surrounding outer space exploration
and resource harvesting has dramatically improved, many
scholars agree that the surrounding legal regime remains
unclear.6 Without a legal mechanism to ensure property rights
in harvested outer space materials, both governments and
private companies may hesitate to undertake the high risks and
costs of obtaining space resources without assurances that they
will truly own them.7 Alternatively, as this Note discusses,
allowing parties to acquire space resources without further
clarifying some restrictions has the potential to breach
international obligations in the distant future.8 In response to
developing technology and this unclear legal regime, scholars
have recommended immediate action to enact more substantive
space law before technology has developed the ability to reach
celestial bodies.9

4

Id.
Id. (discussing the economic potential of precious metals and water on
asteroids); Richard B. Bilder, A Legal Regime for the Mining of Helium-3 on the
Moon: U.S. Policy Options, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 243, 243–46 (2010) (discussing
the potential value of helium-3 as an extremely effective and environmentally
friendly isotope for thermonuclear energy). Although all of the celestial bodies with
which this Note is concerned are clearly located in “Outer Space,” defining where
that boundary begins and Earth ends has proven troublesome. See generally
Theodore W. Goodman, To the End of the Earth: A Study of the Boundary Between
Earth and Space, 36 J. SPACE L. 87 (2010).
6
Rosanna Sattler, Transporting A Legal System for Property Rights: From the
Earth to the Stars, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 23, 27–29 (2005); Kyle A. Jacobsen, Comment,
From Interstate to Interstellar Commerce: Incorporating the Private Sector into
International Aerospace Law, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 159, 191 (2014); Blake Gilson, Note,
Defending Your Client’s Property Rights in Space: A Practical Guide for the Lunar
Litigator, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1367, 1367 (2011).
7
Henry R. Hertzfeld & Frans G. von der Dunk, Bringing Space Law into the
Commercial World: Property Rights Without Sovereignty, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 81, 81
(2005); Kurt Anderson Baca, Property Rights in Outer Space, 58 J. AIR L. & COM.
1041, 1045 (1993).
8
See infra Part IV.
9
Bilder, supra note 5, at 277–80; Sattler, supra note 6, at 44. But compare
Hertzfeld & von der Dunk, supra note 7, at 95, with Byron C. Brittingham, Does the
World Really Need New Space Law?, 12 OR. REV. INT’L L. 31, 48 (2010).
5
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In 2015, the House of Representatives offered a legal
structure in H.R. 2262, the Spurring Private Aerospace
Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship Act of 2015––or the
“SPACE Act”––which was later passed under the U.S.
Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act (“SLCA”).10
Fittingly, the stated purpose of the act is to make regulatory
conditions more predictable, and, as stated in a report by the
Science, Space, and Technology Committee, SLCA attempts to
add some stability to the uncertain legal regime of property
rights in space resources.11
SLCA seeks to clarify property rights by an amendment to
51 U.S.C.A. § 51303:
A United States citizen engaged in commercial recovery of an
asteroid resource or a space resource under this chapter shall be
entitled to any asteroid resource or space resource obtained,
including to possess, own, transport, use, and sell the asteroid
resource or space resource obtained in accordance with
applicable law, including the international obligations of the
United States.12

Further, the proposed amendments originally included a
civil action against harmful interference with asteroid resource
operations, provided the aggrieved party: (1) acted in accordance
with the international obligations of the United States; (2) was
first in time; and (3) acted reasonably for exploration and
utilization of asteroid resources.13 However, that provision has
since been removed and replaced with a simple statement that
the President shall promote outer space resource recovery free
from harmful interference.14
Critics of the act have attacked the property rights regime as
controversial in light of an uncertain structure of existing space
law.15 Because SLCA relies on meeting international obligations
10
U.S.
Commercial
Space
Launch
Competitiveness
Act
§ 402,
51 U.S.C.A. §§ 51301–03 (West 2015).
11
H.R. REP. NO. 114–119, at 8 (2015).
12
51 U.S.C.A. § 51303.
13
SPACE Act, H.R. 2262, 114th Cong. (2015).
14
51 U.S.C.A. § 51302(a)(3) (West 2015).
15
Doug Messier, House Democrats Slam SPACE Act as “Commercial Space
Industry Wish List”, PARABOLICARC.COM (May 21, 2015, 12:04 PM),
http://www.parabolicarc.com/2015/05/21/house-democrats-slam-space-actcommercial-space-industry-list. Objection by both private and public parties to the
SPACE Act has been far reaching. However, this Note focuses only on the issue of
property rights in outer space resources.
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in resource acquisition, these critics raise a legitimate question
as to the effectiveness of unilateral grants of space resource
property rights.16
Further, these domestic objections may
eventually return as international complaints. However, without
imposing some type of regulation by unilateral action, the United
States might have found its private companies venturing into
outer space without any guiding principles of law except the
unclear regime that was already in place.
This Note utilizes SLCA as a focal point to discuss the
potential of domestic regulation that grants private companies
property rights in harvested outer space resources and how, if at
all, these rights can exist within the boundaries of current
international obligations. First, it outlines current international
obligations in space law, delving into the treaties governing space
law and analagous obligations in Antarctica and the deep sea.
Second, this Note discusses how SLCA meets those guidelines
and where it falls short. This Part draws on the Roman law
principles of res nullius and res communis, the supporting
sections of the Act itself, and analogies to the water law regime
in the western United States to both support the Act and
establish its shortcomings. Finally, this Note concludes that
private companies can harvest space resources under SLCA
consistently with the United States’ international obligations,
but a sunset provision on this property rights regime, limiting its
duration to a set term of years or until an updated international
treaty regime is established, may be necessary to remain in
compliance with international obligations.
I.

BACKGROUND

In order to determine the international obligations of the
United States—and therefore, of its private spaceflight
companies under SLCA—it is necessary to explore the unclear
boundaries of existing space law and a few analogous treaty
regimes.17 The primary treaty concerning outer space property
rights is the Outer Space Treaty, to which the United States is
16
See 161 CONG. REC. H8190 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2015) (Statement of Rep.
Edwards) (“I am concerned that we are rushing to establish policy on space resource
mining and utilization without having vetted the range of issues associated with it
and without having carried out the necessary due diligence to inform legislation that
relates to our international treaty obligations with our international partners.”).
17
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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party.18 Additionally, the Moon Agreement presents significant
context for outer space property rights in international law,
although the United States has not signed or ratified the
agreement.19 However, with both treaties in place, the United
States has taken unilateral steps to preserve property rights in
objects it has harvested from outer space. Finally, looking
towards the future of space law, analogous international law and
obligations provide some guidance through the Third Law of the
Sea Convention20 and the various treaties comprising the
Antarctic Treaty System.21
In order to better understand the qualities of property rights
under the current treaty regime, background property principles
from Roman law help frame the discussion. The Romans defined
different categories of things subject to varying types and extents
of ownership, including res communis and res nullius.22 Res
communis were meant to be enjoyed and shared by all people in
common.23 Res nullius included things not subject to standing
ownership, but attainable by the first person to occupy or capture
the property.24 The following international property regimes help
to identify the place where resource rights in outer space fall
between the two.

18
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967,
18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter “Outer Space Treaty”].
19
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, adopted Dec. 5, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 21 [hereinafter “Moon
Agreement”].
20
See generally Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Final
Act, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/121 (Dec. 10, 1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1245
[hereinafter “UNCLOS”].
21
See generally Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71;
Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora, June 2, 1964,
17 U.S.T. 996; Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, June 1, 1972, 29
U.S.T. 441, 1080 U.N.T.S. 175; Convention and Conservation of Antarctic Marine
Living Resources, May 20, 1980, 33 U.S.T. 3476, 1329 U.N.T.S. 47.
22
PAUL DU PLESSIS, BORKOWSKI’S TEXTBOOK ON ROMAN LAW 152 (5th ed.
2015).
23
Id.
24
Id.
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The Outer Space Treaty

The Outer Space Treaty, signed in 1967, presents the first
international regulation of outer space.25 According to its annex,
the Outer Space Treaty attempts to ensure international
cooperation in the peaceful use and exploration of outer space,
while prohibiting the presence of nuclear weapons.26 Aside from
Articles I and II, which directly impact property rights, a few
other noncontroversial international obligations bind parties to
the treaty and possibly bind private enterprises launching from
those parties.27 First dispensing with these noncontroversial
provisions, one of the central obligations of the Outer Space
Treaty is contained in Article IV, which prohibits the presence of
weapons of mass destruction or any military action in outer
space.28 Further, Article V mandates that parties must render
all possible assistance to all other parties’ astronauts, and inform
the United Nations of any conditions that may pose a hazard.29
Articles XI and XII impose disclosure requirements,
mandating that spacefarers must keep the public informed of
their activities, and allow for other parties to visit outer space
installations after appropriate notice.30 Finally, the last major
requirement that may affect private entities in outer space comes
from Article IX, which expands on the requirements of
international cooperation in outer space.31 Article IX mandates
that parties must act with due regard to other nations’ interests
in outer space and avoid contamination of celestial bodies.32
Opponents of SLCA may cite the cooperation principles of Article
IX to prohibit the act’s unilateral grant of resource rights, but
25

See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 18.
Id.
27
Articles VI and VII together provide that States party to the treaty must
authorize and supervise the outer space activity of nongovernment entities
launching from their territory, further requiring any launching State to accept
liability for any damages caused by even private entities. Id. arts. VI–VII.
28
Id. art. IV.
29
Id. art. V.
30
Id. arts. XI–XII.
31
Id. art. IX.
32
Id. Some scholars argue that environmental controls and cooperation
requirements reflect the inclusion of the “common heritage of mankind” principle in
the Outer Space Agreement before its first formal expression in UNCLOS. See, e.g.,
Jennifer Frakes, The Common Heritage of Mankind Principle and the Deep Seabed,
Outer Space, and Antarctica: Will Developed and Developing Nations Reach A
Compromise?, Note, 21 WIS. INT’L L.J. 409, 420–25 (2003). See infra Section III.B.,
for a full description of the common heritage principle.
26
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United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/122 allows
States to fully determine the extent of their international
cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space.33 While the
preceding provisions may not significantly impact parties
operating under SLCA, the remaining relevant articles dealing
with property in outer space present a greater impediment.
Articles I and II of the treaty provide the sparse property
rights regime currently in place. Generally more expansive,
Article II plainly states that “[o]uter space, including the moon
and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation
by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any
other means.”34 Article I remains a bit less clear, dictating that
“[t]he exploration and use of outer space . . . shall be the province
of all mankind” and that “States shall facilitate and encourage
international co-operation,” while simultaneously espousing
unrestricted
development
of
outer
space
through
35
“free . . . exploration and use” and “free access.” While the lessclear mandates of Article I may restrict outer space property
rights in the distant future, the broader restrictions of Article II
present a more plain issue.
First, Article II raises concerns over whether a private entity
can avoid its authority by claiming private property rights,
rather than committing a national appropriation.36 Generally,
private American companies may be bound by the United
States’s full obligations under Article VI of the Outer Space
Treaty, which states that States party are responsible for the
actions of private parties launched from their territories.37
Alternatively, Article II itself limits appropriation by any means,
not just national claims of appropriation, and therefore may
33
G.A. Res. 51/122, ¶ 2 (Dec. 13, 1996). This definition of cooperation also comes
into play regarding Article I, the first provision of the Outer Space Treaty that
mandates international cooperation. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 18, art. I.
34
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 18, art. II.
35
Id. art. I.
36
Gilson, supra note 6, at 1388–90; Brandon C. Gruner, Comment, A New Hope
for International Space Law: Incorporating Nineteenth Century First Possession
Principles into the 1967 Space Treaty for the Colonization of Outer Space in the
Twenty-First Century, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 299, 332–33 (2004).
37
Gilson, supra note 6, at 1388–90. “States Parties to the Treaty shall bear
international responsibility for national activities in outer space, including the moon
and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by governmental
agencies or by non-governmental entities.” Outer Space Treaty, supra note 18, art.
VI.
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impact private companies, as well.38 Article II serves as an even
stronger regulation in outer space because, as some scholars have
argued, it is given the force of customary international law.39
With regards to SLCA, private parties acquire property
rights in materials harvested consistent with the “international
obligations of the United States.”40 Therefore, even if private
companies are not subject to Article II’s ban on national
appropriation, they must meet the United States’s obligations
under Article II in order to attain property rights under SLCA.
Directly addressing this burden, SLCA has even expressly
attempted to avoid the national appropriation issue by
affirmatively stating that its authorizations do not constitute a
claim of national sovereignty.41 Even if that statement is
ineffective, a few scholars have concluded that Article II does not
affect private companies harvesting outer space resources
because national sovereignty is not a necessary predicate for
private parties to obtain property rights.42
Second, Article II fails to resolve whether merely harvesting
resources—rather than making territorial claims—constitutes an
appropriation, although Article I provides a more direct
application to the issue.43 By its various provisions on free
exploration, use, and access, the Outer Space Treaty is very
permissive regarding space resources, likely extending into
allowing resource acquisition despite the appropriation limits of
Article II.44 Because the Outer Space Treaty is the only space
law treaty binding the United States on property rights, there
does not appear to be anything preventing outer space resource
acquisition.45 Such a pure lack of property right regulation would
lead to a “first in time, first in right” structure of ownership in

38

Gilson, supra note 6, at 1388–90.
F. Kenneth Schwetje, Protecting Space Assets: A Legal Analysis of “Keep Out
Zones”, 15 J. SPACE L. 131, 141 (1987) (discussing that Article II may, as customary
international law, affect nations that have not ratified the Outer Space Treaty).
40
51 U.S.C.A. § 51303 (West 2015).
41
Id. § 403.
42
Hertzfeld & von der Dunk, supra note 7, at 97–98; Alexander W. Salter &
Peter T. Leeson, Celestial Anarchy: A Threat to Outer Space Commerce?, 34 CATO J.
581, 583 (2014).
43
Sattler, supra note 6, at 28–29.
44
Baca, supra note 7, at 1066.
45
Hertzfeld & von der Dunk, supra note 7, at 83; Bilder, supra note 5, at 273–
74.
39
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line with the Roman law ownership principle of res nullius
through possession, as long as parties avoid national
appropriations.46
However, Article I reserves outer space as the province of all
mankind, at least vaguely limiting property rights if not, as some
scholars argue, fully reserving resources to common use in line
with the Roman law principle of res communis.47 Regardless,
some scholars argue that Article I’s permissiveness on
exploration and use make the treaty amenable to resource
acquisition even if it includes some common use principles.48
This res communis principle caused a great deal of controversy
when potentially expressed through the term “common heritage
of mankind” in the next major treaty to deal with property right
in space, the Moon Agreement.49
B.

The Moon Agreement

The Moon Agreement, opened for signature in 1979 as the
most recent multilateral attempt at expanding space law,
addresses the need to clarify and expand the legal regime
surrounding the use of outer space in its annex.50 Although it is
commonly known as the Moon Agreement, the Agreement also
extends to “other celestial bodies,” implicitly including
asteroids.51 However, only sixteen States have ratified the Moon
Agreement as of January 1, 2015, none of which are spacefaring
nations.52 Although these provisions are not directly binding on
the United States, they may provide context for understanding
its obligations under the Outer Space Treaty, or may eventually
become obligations if the United States should eventually sign
and ratify the Moon Agreement.53
46

Gruner, supra note 36, at 345–46. For more on res nullius, see infra Section

III.A.
47
See generally Gruner, supra note 36; Gilson, supra note 6. For more on res
communis, see infra Section III.A.
48
Eric Husby, Comment, Sovereignty and Property Rights in Outer Space, 3 J.
INT’L L. & PRAC. 359, 370 (1994).
49
See generally Bilder, supra note 5; Frakes, supra note 32.
50
Moon Agreement, supra note 19, 1363 U.N.T.S. at 22.
51
Id.
52
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Status of International
Agreements Relating to Activities in Outer Space as at 1 January 2015, UNITED
NATIONS
OFFICE
FOR
OUTER
SPACE
AFFAIRS
(Apr.
8,
2015),
http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/limited/c2/AC105_C2_2015_CRP08E.pdf.
53
Bilder, supra note 5, at 269–70.
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The controversy preventing the adoption of the Moon
Agreement surrounds Article 11, a provision proposing a
substantial property rights regime.54
Three particularly
troublesome sections of Article 11 state:
1. The moon and its natural resources are the common heritage
of mankind, which finds its expression in the provisions of this
Agreement, in particular in paragraph 5 of this article.
...
3. Neither the surface nor the subsurface of the moon, nor any
part thereof or natural resources in place, shall become property
of any State, international intergovernmental or nongovernmental organization, national organization or nongovernmental entity or of any natural person.
...
5. States Parties to this Agreement hereby undertake to
establish an international régime, including appropriate
procedures, to govern the exploitation of the natural resources
of the moon as such exploitation is about to become feasible.55

These three sections of Article 11 each provide perceived
detriments to the commercial exploitation of outer space that led
to the agreement’s failure, but also evoke counterarguments that
may point to its future success.
First, the United States and other spacefaring States
opposed the agreement’s use of the res communis “common
heritage of mankind” principle, especially after that same
principle caused UNCLOS to fail.56 Opponents of the Moon
Agreement assert that the meaning of “common heritage of
mankind” is fixed in international law and dictates equitable
resource sharing under the direction of an international
organization, as was proposed in UNCLOS.57 Supporters counter
that the language of Article 11(1) expressly limits the usage of
54
Moon Agreement, supra note 19, 1363 U.N.T.S. at 25. Although the limitation
on property rights expressed in this Article only references the moon, per Article 1,
the agreement’s provision applies to all celestial bodies in our solar system, aside
from earth, until other legal norms are established for those bodies. Id. at 22.
55
Id. at 25. Essentially, these three provisions mandate that celestial bodies are
the common heritage of mankind, that no part of them are subject to any property
right, and that an international organization must manage the natural resources on
these celestial bodies.
56
Carol R. Buxton, Property in Outer Space: The Common Heritage of Mankind
Principle vs. the “First in Time, First in Right” Rule of Property Law, 69 J. AIR L. &
COM. 689, 699 (2004); Bilder, supra note 5, at 263–64. For more on UNCLOS, see
infra Section II.D.
57
Bilder, supra note 5, at 265; UNCLOS, supra note 20, 21 I.L.M. at 1271, 1293.

FINAL_DIMARIA

2016]

10/20/2016 8:43 AM

STARSHIPS AND ENTERPRISE

425

common heritage doctrine to the provisions of the agreement
itself.58 Further, the agreement likely does not bar private
entities from harvesting and retaining space resources because
that interpretation would contradict the “free exploration and
use” of the Outer Space Treaty.59 Finally, certain provisions of
the Moon Agreement itself adjust equitable principles to favor
the entities that acquired benefits from outer space.60
Second, Article 11(3) caused controversy by, at first glance,
prohibiting property rights in space resources.61 However, the
United States proposed the term “in place” to attempt to offer
some property rights for resource-harvesting entities.62 Further,
parts of the agreement promote the collection of mineral samples
for scientific purposes, and even those resources that are
collected for economic purposes will likely include an additional
scientific component for the foreseeable future.63
Finally, Article 11(5) aroused opposition by subjecting lunar
resources to an international organization’s control, again similar
to deep-sea bed mining in UNCLOS.64 In response, supporters
argue that the Moon Agreement does not dictate the type of
resource regime that must exist in this international
organization, merely that States party must undertake to
establish one.65 Additionally, any party to the Moon Agreement
that does not approve of the organization may refuse to join.66
Finally, many scholars still support the idea of relying on an
international organization to resolve the clarity issues in space
law, and the Moon Agreement may provide the best framework to
begin such a development.67
Returning to SLCA, the United States is not restricted by
the Moon Agreement because it is not a signatory. Further, the
provisions of the Outer Space Treaty likely allow private entities
to acquire space resources.68 To that effect, multiple United
58

Moon Agreement, supra note 19, 1363 U.N.T.S. at 25.
Baca, supra note 7, at 1066.
60
Bilder, supra note 5, at 268–69.
61
Moon Agreement, supra note 19, 1363 U.N.T.S. at 25.
62
Bilder, supra note 5, at 267–68; Leslie I. Tennen, Towards a New Regime for
Exploitation of Outer Space Mineral Resources, 88 NEB. L. REV. 794, 813 (2009).
63
Tennen, supra note 62, at 813.
64
Moon Agreement, supra note 19, 1363 U.N.T.S. at 25.
65
Bilder, supra note 5, at 266; Tennen, supra note 62, at 814.
66
Bilder, supra note 5, at 267.
67
See infra Section IV.A; Gilson, supra note 6, at 1402–05.
68
See infra Section II.A; Hertzfeld & von der Dunk, supra note 7, at 83.
59
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States government officials have opined that neither the Outer
Space Treaty nor the Moon Agreement would stop private
entities from obtaining property rights.69 However, private
harvesting of space resources still may be hampered by the
uncertainty of the international regime levied against the
substantial cost of space prospecting.70 Regardless, the United
States has its own precedent in supporting the position that
property rights in space objects can stay consistent with
international obligations.
C.

Existing Property Rights in Space Resources

The United States has enforced its own property rights over
moon rocks through sting operations on two separate occasions.71
In one situation that went to trial, United States v. One Lucite
Ball Containing Lunar Material,72 the United States succeeded
in a forfeiture action to recover a stolen piece of moon rock
retrieved on a NASA mission.73
The moon rock and
accompanying plaque were given to Honduras as a gift, stolen
from the country’s government, and then sold to a United States
citizen in Florida.74 Establishing property rights in the moon
rock was essential to the court’s analysis because, as the court
quoted, “in order for property to be considered ‘stolen,’ the
property must rightfully belong to someone other than the person
who has it.”75 After succeeding in its case, the United States
returned the moon rock to Honduras.76
In the second major sting operation, federal agents and local
law enforcement arrested a seventy-four-year-old woman who
was attempting to sell a very small piece of moon rock that she
claimed Neil Armstrong gave her husband, a NASA employee.77
The United States further asserted its property rights in
harvested lunar material by taking her moon rock, despite the

69

Bilder, supra note 5, at 271.
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
71
MATTHEW J. KLEIMAN, THE LITTLE BOOK OF SPACE LAW 158–60 (2013).
72
252 F. Supp. 2d 1367 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
73
Id. at 1369.
74
Id. at 1369–70.
75
Id. at 1378 (quoting United States v. Portrait of Wally, No. 99 Civ. 9940
(MBM), 2002 WL 553532, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)).
76
KLEIMAN, supra note 71, at 159.
77
Id. at 160.
70
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possibility that she may have obtained it legitimately as a gift.78
Somewhat unsurprisingly, NASA has formally stated that all
lunar material obtained on its missions is property of the United
States.79 These types of unilateral property rights claims over
harvested outer space resources all have analogous precedent in
the United States’s treatment of UNCLOS and even some of the
development of the treaty system governing Antarctica.
D. Analogous International Law Regimes
Although treaty regimes regarding other high-risk, highreward mining will not directly regulate the activities of private
companies in space, they may provide guidance on expanding
those obligations in the future.80 Therefore, both UNCLOS and
the Antarctic Treaty represent potential future influence in outer
space mining regimes and assistance in understanding actual
space law obligations. Further, the negotiation and ratification
history surrounding UNCLOS is relevant because it depicts the
United States’s rejection of an international regime in favor of
domestic regulation respecting certain other aspects of
international law.81 Additionally, the legal framework governing
Antarctica is particularly relevant because the Outer Space
Treaty drew some of its language directly from the Antarctic
Treaty.82
1.

UNCLOS

In the 1970s, governments and private companies began
seriously considering mining the deep sea to monetize the
significant mineral deposits available, despite the high costs and
risk.83 UNCLOS opened for signature in 1982 in order to provide
clear regulations for deep sea mining.84 UNCLOS was the first
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Id.
Id. at 156.
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See, e.g., Sattler, supra note 6, at 32–37 (discussing the Antarctic treaty
system and UNCLOS as examples on which the international community could
expand existing space law).
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Bilder, supra note 5, at 273–74; Buxton, supra note 56, at 699.
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H. G. Darwin, Note, The Outer Space Treaty, 42 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 278, 279
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Barbara Ellen Heim, Note, Exploring the Last Frontiers for Mineral
Resources: A Comparison of International Law Regarding the Deep Seabed, Outer
Space, and Antarctica, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 819, 822 (1990).
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treaty to formally dispense with resources under the common
heritage of mankind principle, and established an International
Seabed Authority to do so.85 These two particular provisions led
to the Reagan administration’s famous rejection of UNCLOS on
the theory that subjecting deep sea resources to an international
organization’s equitable management would crush free
enterprise.86
Next, in 1982, the United States passed the Deep Seabed
Hard Mineral Resources Act to domestically regulate deep sea
mining after rejecting UNCLOS.87 This law acts as a purely
temporary measure to provide licenses to domestic entities
seeking to exploit the deep seabed until a successful
international regime is created.88 Even as a merely domestic law,
the Act specifies that “commercial recovery of hard mineral
resources of the deep seabed are freedoms of the high seas
subject to a duty of reasonable regard to the interests of other
states,” and that any uses should be in line with recognized
principles of international law.89 Passing this law after rejecting
the international structure of UNCLOS represents historical
precedent of the United States regulating with unilateral action
that at least remains conscious of some existing international
obligations.90 The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act’s
domestic licensing structure, in line with international
obligations, looks very similar to SLCA, aside from the latter
assumedly remaining permanent.
In response to the United States rejecting UNCLOS and
promulgating its own deep sea mining structure, the United
Nations renegotiated the mining provisions in 1994.91 This
amendment gave the United States several advantages, such as a
permanent seat on the international agency, removal of the
technology-sharing requirement originally in UNCLOS, and a
permit-granting structure including a requirement to mine so
entities could not stake an exclusionary claim while unable to

85
Sattler, supra note 6, at 34–35; Heim, supra note 83, at 826–27. For more on
the common heritage of mankind principle, see infra Section III.B.
86
Bilder, supra note 5, at 263.
87
Sattler, supra note 6, at 35–36.
88
Id.
89
30 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(12) (2012).
90
Bilder, supra note 5, at 273–74.
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Sattler, supra note 6, at 35.
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mine.92 Although the United States signed the 1994 amendment,
it has still refused to sign UNCLOS, despite renewed interest in
doing so.93
2.

Antarctic Treaty

Similarly, the Antarctic Treaty System provides an example
of an international regime structured to manage resource
acquisition in a risky, but potentially fruitful, area.94 After
numerous States had claimed sovereignty over portions of
Antarctica, the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 replaced these claims
with a new legal regime.95 The agreement vested power in
twenty-seven “Consultative parties,” who meet annually to make
decisions as long as they continue to undertake a certain amount
of activity in Antarctica.96
Because the treaty includes
environmental
requirements,
research
disclosure,
and
prohibitions against conflict, it is arguable that it implicates the
common heritage of mankind principle.97 Regardless, the treaty
only regulates resource rights as far as its other interfering
provisions dictate.98 In this case, the Antarctic Treaty’s strict
environmental controls effectively prevent resource acquisition
rights, despite encouraging research.99
In response to the Antarctic Treaty’s unsatisfactory resource
regime, the United States and thirty-two other countries
negotiated the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic
Mineral Resource Activities (“Antarctic Mineral Convention”)
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Id. at 36–37.
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Id. at 32; see generally Christopher C. Joyner, The Evolving Antarctic
Minerals Regime, 19 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 73 (1988).
95
Christopher C. Joyner, Antarctica and the Law of the Sea: Rethinking the
Current Legal Dilemmas, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 415, 417–20 (1981).
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Id. at 420; Sattler, supra note 6, at 32. For more on the controversy
surrounding the format of this agreement, see Frakes, supra note 32, at 429–32;
Joyner, supra note 94, at 420–21 (describing critics’ objections to the Antarctic
“club”).
97
Frakes, supra note 32, at 428; Joyner, supra note 94, at 425.
98
Sattler, supra note 6, at 33.
99
Id. This discrepancy is similar to some interpretations of the Outer Space
Treaty that view the prohibition on claims of sovereignty fully prohibiting property
rights as well. See supra Section II.A. In either case, the Antarctic Treaty contains
much stricter environmental controls than the Outer Space Treaty because the
Antarctic Treaty effectively designated Antarctica as a natural reserve. Sattler,
supra note 6, at 33.
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completely outside of the United Nations.100 The agreement
required mining parties to receive the consent of all other
signatories to the treaty and retained substantially all of the
environmental protections in the Antarctic Treaty.101 However,
the Antarctic Mineral Convention failed to acquire signatures
from all consultative parties—only sixteen at the time—and
neither it, nor a significant replacement provision on resource
rights, has entered into force to address Antarctic resources.102
As it currently stands, Antarctic resource acquisition continues
to be substantially halted, and less-developed countries continue
to push for more participation in an area that arguably can be
considered res communis and subject to the common heritage of
mankind principle.103
II. DISCUSSION
Equipped with background knowledge on the current space
law regime and analogous international law, a few other legal
structures assist in analyzing the U.S. Commercial Space Launch
Competitiveness Act’s (“SLCA”) viability in light of international
obligations. First, returning to Roman law property principles
assists in pinpointing the limits of SLCA’s applicability in the
context of the foregoing international obligations. Next, the
water law regime in the western United States exemplifies a
modern use of classic Roman law property principles, a useful
mark against which to examine and categorize SLCA.
A.

Res Communis v. Res Nullius

Because outer space remains a widely untouched area, a
return to early Roman law principles may prove useful in
assessing how property rights may be quantified in the context of
our current unclear international obligations. Some scholars
have already attempted to categorize property rights in outer
space as either the res communis or res nullius paradigm from

100
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Roman law.104 As previously stated, these categories represent
different classifications for things subject to varying types and
extents of ownership.105
First, the Romans classified things as res communis if the
things were meant to be enjoyed and shared by all people in
common.106 This category included air, water, and fish on the
high seas, and precluded private ownership or intentional
interference with others’ use.107 In stark contrast, res nullius
included things not subject to standing ownership, but fully
available to occupation, for example, by capture.108 Generally,
law students become acquainted with this category in property
class because gaining ownership of res nullius includes the
classic capture of wild animals.109
Second, the Roman law principles for obtaining ownership
also provide some insight in the context of outer space resource
ownership. Dominium was the strongest property right in
Roman law, acquired only if: (1) the owner had commercium,
meaning that he was a Roman citizen or an expressly authorized
foreigner;110 (2) the property was able to be privately owned; and
(3) the property was obtained by an appropriate method.111 The
property right structure under SLCA mirrors dominium well.
First, commercium parallels the United States’s launch licensing,
requiring all private entities to obtain a license granted by the
government in order to leave orbit at all,112 just as the Romans
needed commercium rights to later exercise dominium. Second,
SLCA endeavors to clarify that resources acquired from celestial
bodies are amenable to private ownership, just like the second
element of dominium.113 Third, SLCA dictates that resources
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See generally Gruner, supra note 36; Husby, supra note 48.
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51 U.S.C. § 50904 (2012).
113
Id. § 50903.
107

DU PLESSIS,

FINAL_DIMARIA

432

10/20/2016 8:43 AM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:415

must be acquired in accordance with international obligations,
mirroring dominium’s appropriate method requirement but
providing a—still unclear—standard of those methods.114
Alternatively, Roman law provides the concept of occupatio
for claiming property in res nullius.115 Occupatio provided
property rights to the individual who first claimed some property
that had either never been claimed before or had been
abandoned.116 This principle still exists in several instances of
However,
first-in-time, first-in-right claims in property.117
occupatio can only apply to res nullius, and it is unlikely that
outer space can be either purely res nullius or res communis
given the current treaty regime.
B.

Methods of Applying Roman Law to Present Day Space Law

First, the res communis principle has found a more intense
modern expression in the common heritage of mankind
doctrine.118 While common heritage doctrine does not have a
generally accepted definition, it implies any combination of five
elements: (1) nonappropriation, (2) common management,
(3) sharing of benefits, (4) peaceful purposes, and (5) preservation
for future generations.119 Although res communis can include all
five of these elements, common heritage of mankind doctrine’s
expression has generally mandated less restrictive versions of
each element.120
Further, others assert that the common
heritage structure allows and even encourages resource
harvesting.121 As stated previously, spacefaring nations seemed
to reject the common heritage of mankind principle by refusing to
sign the Moon Agreement.122 However, if negotiations produce a
114
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supra note 22, at 190.
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Id. For example, see infra Section III.C on water law.
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international community limiting the common heritage principle, and the Moon
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highly limited res communis international structure, rather than
a potentially restrictive expression under the common heritage
principle, such an agreement could be amenable to spacefaring
States in the future.
Second, while negotiation tempering the common heritage of
mankind principle may relax res communis enough to provide a
successful international organization, perhaps clarifying rights
and increasing regulation on pure res nullius principles through
SLCA may result in an acceptable starting place for private
entities seeking to exploit space resources. In line with the
international obligations guiding SLCA, outer space is no longer
purely res nullius, because the Outer Space Treaty has imposed
some environmental restrictions and a requirement of
international cooperation.123 Some scholars have argued that the
successful middle ground lies in exclusive zones for States to
encourage industry but avoid giving spacefarers free reign.124
Regardless, SLCA initially mitigates a pure res nullius approach
by requiring that companies acquire resources consistent with
international obligations, not merely by being first in time.125
Further, it seems as though SLCA would shift ownership
acquisition from occupatio of res nullius to something more
analogous to dominium, as previously discussed.126 It seems as
though SLCA aims for a res nullius approach by granting
property rights to whomever is first in time, but does so in outer
space, which is more similar to a res communis environment in
light of the Outer Space Treaty’s ban on national appropriation.
To better analyze international obligations as limitations on a
pure res nullius approach, a different analogy is necessary.
C.

Harmful Interference and Water Law

Certain States’ water law exemplifies significant first-intime, first-in-right property rights in modern law.127 In the
context of water law, this right is referred to as “prior
appropriation,” the first element of general property rights in
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water.128 Secondly, an appropriator must put the water to
beneficial use in order to maintain property rights.129 Beneficial
use concerns both the type of use and the amount of use.130 Like
the SPACE Act’s former harmful interference requirements of
reasonableness in mining,131 beneficial use supplements first-intime property rights with an assurance that resources are
actually being used rather than merely held. Although the
former civil action against harmful interference has since been
removed, the principle still remains in the act, and points to at
least some necessity for reasonable exclusionary rights over
companies’ mining installations.132
The prior appropriation doctrine worked well considering the
small population in the western United States; however, as the
population grew and the stability of water sources decreased,
prior appropriation began to demonstrate its lack of efficiency.133
Because prior appropriation doctrine protects any beneficial use,
even low value uses like growing plants of lower economic value
could be prioritized over a subsequent appropriator’s need for
drinking water.134 In order to remedy this potential situation,
scholars have suggested the need for equitable principles, or at
least reevaluating the extent of beneficial uses and issuing some
rights pursuant to time-limited permits.135
Although space resources are seemingly infinite, some
asteroids are more costly to reach than others. As more parties
seek resource rights and obtain what may still be construed as
exclusionary “harmful interference” rights on the more accessible
celestial bodies, this approach will come closer to defeating the
free exploration and use driving our space law.136 Although some
water law regimes worked well for a significant length of time,
the recent call for change illuminates a potential downfall for
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SLCA in the distant future. Outer space mining regulations that
aim for a res nullius approach will likely breach international
obligations if outer space ever becomes significantly saturated.137
Conversely, Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty itself allows
parties to seek consultation if they anticipate “harmful
interference” by another party.138 Because at least some basis of
exclusionary rights against harmful interference exist in the
international obligations of the United States, the principle
under SLCA may ultimately remain consistent with
international obligations. This tension keeps the international
legality of SLCA just as unclear as the United States’s
international obligations themselves. However, the suggestion
for time-limited permits on a first-in-time basis provides another
interesting element for solving the problem before it occurs in
outer space.
III. PREVIOUSLY OFFERED SOLUTIONS AND A FURTHER PROPOSAL
Because space law is so sparse, many scholars have offered
methods of resolving the ambiguity of property rights in space.
These various approaches all present interesting, long-term
solutions, but mostly require widespread international
cooperation that may be difficult to achieve. However, many of
these structures can come to fruition after—or in conjunction
with—the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act
(“SLCA”).
Ultimately, while an international organization
established to manage outer space property rights is a noble goal,
SLCA is a more viable short-term option for incentivizing private
actors to advance outer space activities, given a few time and
event-sensitive restrictions so that it does not outlive its
usefulness.
A.

Scholars’ Proposed Property Regimes in Outer Space

Many scholars offer a variety of broad international solutions
to better allocate property rights in space resources.139 First,
many suggestions use existing international structures to guide
137
As mentioned throughout this Note, resources must be acquired consistently
with international obligations. 51 U.S.C.A. § 51303 (West 2015).
138
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 18, art. IX.
139
Tennen, supra note 62, at 824–30 (compiling various scholars’ recommended
international organizations); Bilder, supra note 5, at 297–99; Sattler, supra note 6,
at 37–44.
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the property discussion, including the framework of the
International Space Station Intergovernmental Agreement
(“IGA”).140 Under this agreement, NASA has signed a series of
agreements with various other States’ space programs to share
funding and technology for the International Space Station’s
(“ISS”) operation.141
While NASA conducts the overall
administration of this system, each individual funder retains
ownership and jurisdiction over its own module and crew.142
Under this structure, private companies could still fund their
own enterprises and reap the benefits, while having NASA or a
nongovernmental organization (“NGO”) coordinate parties to
avoid interference.143 Further, if bilateral treaties and NGO
management become international obligations to which
American private parties must conform under SLCA, no
compliance issues would seem to arise in ensuring property
rights in harvested resources.
Exclusive economic zones as created and defined by
UNCLOS present another familiar alternative for ensuring
property rights in outer space.144 In its present form as applied
to maritime coastlines, every country has exclusive rights to
exploit and manage the maritime resources within a certain
distance from its coast, but cannot prohibit other countries from
navigating through the exclusive zone.145 In outer space, an
already-existing international organization, like the ITU or
INTELSAT, could allocate certain areas on celestial bodies to
different States for building installations with the understanding
that a certain exclusive economic zone would radiate from that
While the activities taking place in exclusive
location.146
economic zones would remain consistent with SLCA’s grant of
property rights, this structure would require an international
organization, the optimal structure of which remains unclear.147
Alternatively, an international organization could divide
celestial bodies into shares for each country to presently or
eventually exploit, as opposed to a system of arising economic
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
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zones.148
Although this structure would ensure rights for
developing nations, it causes the same issues of requiring an
international organization to divide celestial bodies in the first
place, and seems somewhat unadaptable to mining asteroids—
bodies that remain harder to track than planets or moons.
Further, this structure may directly interfere with the free
exploration and use principles in Article I of the Outer Space
Treaty.
Each of these proposals requires some form of international
organization, and accession to the Moon Agreement would
facilitate its negotiation under Article 11(5).149 Like most of the
other options discussed in this section, the viability of accession
remains dependent on examining what a successful international
management system would look like.
If spacefaring countries are to negotiate an acceptable
international management organization for space resources, they
need to include a few key powers.150 A successful international
organization should include mechanisms for registration of
claims, notice between parties, and dispute resolution.151
Additionally, the organization should ensure that private entities
can undertake all mining activities necessary to obtain space
resources, affirmatively including roles for private companies to
bring all interested parties into the structure of the agreement.152
All of these provisions are consistent with SLCA, with each
somewhat represented in the language of the act itself.153
Protecting the resource interests of nonspacefaring countries
represents a further issue in forming this organization. One
possible solution entails language that results in resource
sharing only after the entity that obtained the resources makes a
fair profit for its risk.154 Alternatively, this organization could set
a flat rate, obtaining a small portion of all resources acquired and
distributing them to nonspacefaring members of the
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organization.155
In either case, SLCA would remain in
compliance because respecting the rules and decisions of any
international organization by which the United States is bound
would constitute international obligations of the United States
and, therefore, of the private companies themselves.
B.

SLCA in Compliance: Synthesizing Short-Term and LongTerm Solutions

While some argue that an international agreement seems to
be the best answer to the property rights problem in outer space,
that solution may be far on the horizon or overly naïve given the
new domestic resource rights under SLCA. Unless a future
international obligation alters the current space law structure,
the primary obligations that SLCA imports to spaceflight
companies in mining remain those under the Outer Space
Treaty.156 As discussed previously,157 it does not appear that any
present international obligations are stopping private spaceflight
companies from gaining property rights in harvested resources.158
However, it is still important to note that, in the future, the
upper bounds of the Outer Space Treaty may limit private
mining by ensuring that private companies cannot infringe on
“free . . . exploration and use by all.”159 Continued unilateral
action and the principle of prohibiting harmful interference could
eventually lead to excluding other parties seeking to make use of
outer space.
Therefore, a permanent, long-term solution must resolve the
limitations that SLCA will put on other entities in both time and
space. First, although space resources are potentially limitless,
the amount of resources currently amenable to harvesting are
certainly limited in light of humanity’s current technological
capacity.160 Similar to issues faced in water law, the accessible
resources in space may eventually become appropriated and
inefficiently utilized under SLCA without any potential for use
by nations from whom the United States is obligated to allow free
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exploration and use.161 If the vast majority of accessible celestial
bodies simultaneously undergo use by private companies
authorized by SLCA, these companies may restrict the use of
other parties and breach international obligations, contrary to
the authorizations of SLCA.
Second, the resource regime under SLCA is similar to water
law in that it may eventually become unsustainable without
imposing any equitable principles over a longer period of time.162
Without sustainable regulations in place as early as possible,
space could eventually become saturated, excluding future
parties from use and exploration by allowing exclusionary rights
to prior appropriators. Although it may seem farfetched to
prepare a legal regime with such a distant future in mind, a lack
of similarly forward thinking led to the present dilemma by
leaving outer space property rights vague while the technology to
obtain such rights ripened.
In order to allow SLCA to incentivize the development of
outer space by private enterprise, but halt growth before it
begins to breach international obligations, a sunset provision is
an effective solution. Reevaluating SLCA after a twenty to
thirty-year term would allow ample time for companies to even
more rapidly develop their spacefaring technology, reap some
benefits of space resources, and accomplish it all before allowing
outer space to become crowded.
An even more effective sunset provision finds precedent in
the United States’s treatment of UNCLOS.163 After rejecting
UNCLOS, the United States passed its own domestic legislation,
stressing that it was a temporary measure until a satisfactory
international agreement could be reached.164 Formalizing this
concept into a sunset provision on the property rights reform of
SLCA would ensure that the Act’s structure would remain in
place only until an international organization would render that
structure unnecessary. The provision would be simple to craft,
effectively terminating SLCA’s property rights regime once the
United States—and perhaps a certain minimum number of other
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States—has ratified an agreement that establishes an
international management organization for outer space
resources.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, SLCA’s property provisions provide an inelegant,
yet acceptable method to affirmatively grant property rights in
outer space resources, allaying some fears of the private
spaceflight industry. However, some upper boundary on SLCA is
necessary in the very long term, before an under-regulated res
nullius regime causes exhaustion of attainable resources and
breaches the “free . . . exploration and use” terms of the Outer
Space Treaty. As previously discussed, likely the best way to
temper such an aggressive property rights regime while
retaining its benefits is through a sunset provision, for a set term
of years or until an effective international organization is
established, whichever happens first.
Clarified property rights in outer space are necessary, not
merely for the financial incentives, but so the attainable wealth
can galvanize private enterprise to further develop technology for
later use in exploration for the good of all mankind. Although
preemptive law granting rights in space rocks may seem like a
very narrow goal, the common good of humanity advanced by this
small incentive is incalculable.

